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Abstract 
A nascent literature in finance and accounting on tail risk in individual stock returns concludes 
that bad news hoarding by corporate managers engenders sudden, extreme crashes in a firm’s 
stock price when the bad news is eventually made public. This literature finds that firm-specific 
crash risk is higher among firms with more severe asymmetric information and agency problems. 
A hitherto disjointed literature spanning the fields of international business, finance, and 
accounting suggests that geographic dispersion in a firm’s operations, and especially dispersion 
across different countries, gives rise to organizational complexities and greater costs of 
monitoring that can exacerbate asymmetric information and agency problems. Motivated by the 
confluence of arguments and findings from these two strands of literature, this paper examines 
whether stock price crash risk is higher among multinational firms than domestic firms. Using a 
large sample of U.S. headquartered firms during 1987-2011, we find robust evidence that 
multinational firms are significantly more likely to crash than domestic firms. Moreover, we show 
that the difference in crash risk between multinational and domestic firms is most acute among 
firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms, including weaker shareholder rights, less 
independent boards, and less stable institutional ownership. Our analysis indicates that stronger 
monitoring from each of these three governance mechanisms significantly attenuates the positive 
relation between crash risk and multinationality. Our findings are robust to the use of alternative 
measures of crash risk and to controlling for known determinants of crash risk identified in prior 
studies. Our study offers new insights that should hold value for scholars and market participants 
interested in understanding the implications of heighted agency problems that multinational firms 
are likely to encounter and scholars and market participants interested in developing models that 
more accurately predict tail risk in the equity returns of individual firms... 
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Scholars in international business fields have long been interested in understanding the benefits and costs 
of internationalization. Numerous studies suggest that there are potential benefits to establishing 
operations outside of a firm’s home country, including scale and scope economies (Tallman and Li, 1996, 
Lu and Beamish, 2004), arbitrage opportunities (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004), operational flexibility (Kogut, 
1983), lower tax liabilities (Hines and Rice, 1994, Rego, 2003), diversification when firms can diversify 
internationally at a lower cost than individual shareholders (Errunza and Senbet, 1981, 1984, Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 1994), and the exploitation of firm-specific, intangible assets (Caves 1971, Morck and Yeung, 
1991). On the other hand, there is also a considerable literature viewing internationalization through the 
lens of agency theory. According to this literature, expanding a firm’s operations across international 
boundaries induces greater complexity in a firm’s operational structure and increases the difficulty and cost 
to investors of monitoring the firm, which in turn gives rise to greater agency costs via more severe 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (Lee and Kwok, 1988, Geringer et al., 1989, Mitchell et 
al., 1992, Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994, Burgman, 1996, Hitt et al., 1997, Sanders and Carpenter, 1998, 
Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 2001, Denis et al., 2002, Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003, Tihanyi et al., 2003, 
Bushman et al., 2004, Lee et al., 2008, Black et al., 2014, Tsao et al., 2016). In this paper, we add new 
insights to this literature by empirically investigating whether stock price crash risk is higher among 
multinational firms than domestic firms. 
The recent financial crisis of 2008-2009 has renewed interest among scholars, policy makers, and market 
participants in understanding and modeling extreme negative outcomes (i.e., tail risk) in financial markets. 
Recently, interest among scholars in this topic has migrated to the study of severe price crashes of 
individual firms. A prominent line of thought that has emerged from this literature is that bad news hoarding 
by corporate managers leads to sudden, extreme price drops when the accumulated bad news is 
eventually made known to the market. Kothari et al. (2009) and Graham et al. (2005) discuss numerous 
factors that can incent managers to delay the release of negative news. In the theory of Jin and Myers 
(2006), managers withhold and accumulate bad news for extended periods until the cost or difficulty of 
concealing their negative private information becomes too high, at which point the accumulated bad news 
tends to come out all at once or very quickly. This causes a crash in the stock price, which can be 
empirically identified as an extreme left-tail outlier in the distribution of weekly or daily firm-specific 
(idiosyncratic) returns. The Jin and Myers (2006) model of bad news hoarding and stock price crashes has 
birthed a new and growing empirical literature focused on identifying corporate activities and/or firm 
characteristics that incent or facilitate bad news hoarding and which, therefore, predict stock price crashes. 
In general, this literature finds that crash risk is positively (negatively) related to factors that exacerbate 
(attenuate) information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and investors (Hutton et al., 
2009, Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b, An and Zhang, 2013, Callen and Fang, 2013, 2015a, Kim et al., 2014, Xu 
et al., 2014, Yuan et al. 2016).  
Based on the rationale that multinational firms face heightened asymmetric information and agency 
problems, we conjecture that managers of multinational firms have greater opportunities to engage in bad 
news hoarding, as well as greater opportunities to engage in self-serving activities (e.g., empire building or 
excess perk consumption) that incentivize bad news hoarding. Motivated by this line of thought, coupled 
with the findings of recent literature concluding that bad news hoarding engenders stock price crashes, we 
propose and empirically test the hypothesis that crash risk is higher among multinational firms than among 
their domestic counterparts. As in prior studies of crash risk, our empirical analysis uses firm-specific 
information available at the close of a given fiscal year to predict the probability of a firm-specific crash 
during the following fiscal year, where a crash is defined as an extreme, negative outlier in the distribution 
of the firm’s weekly idiosyncratic returns.1 Using a large panel of U.S. headquartered firms spanning the 
period 1987-2011, we find that one-year-ahead crash risk is significantly higher among multinational firms 
than domestic firms, both in simple univariate comparisons and in multivariate regressions that control for 
                                                             
1 Specifically, we follow prior literature (Hutton et al., 2009, Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b) and define a crash as a weekly firm-specific log-
return that is 3.1 or more standard deviations below the firm’s average during the year.  
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known predictors of crash risk identified by prior studies. After establishing a positive relation between 
multinationality and crash risk, we further examine whether this relation varies with the strength of the firm’s 
corporate governance mechanisms. This additional analysis is motivated by studies suggesting that 
effective governance mechanisms are necessary to mitigate the risk of elevated agency problems in 
multinational firms or complex firms in general (Bushman et al., 2004, Luo, 2005, Jiraporn et al., 2006, 
Gande et al., 2009, Tsao et al, 2016). We find robust evidence that the difference in crash risk between 
multinational and domestic firms is most acute among firms with weaker corporate governance 
mechanisms, including weaker shareholder rights, less independent boards, and less stable institutional 
ownership. Our analysis indicates that stronger monitoring along each of these three dimensions of 
governance significantly attenuates the positive relation between crash risk and multinationality. All of our 
findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of firm-specific crash risk employed by prior studies, 
including the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (Chen et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2011a, 
2011b).  
Our study makes several important contributions. First, we add to the literature on agency costs in 
multinational firms. Numerous studies have examined the relation between multinationality and measures 
of operating performance or firm value, including Grant (1987), Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999), Qian 
(2002), Denis et al. (2002), Contractor et al. (2003), Doukas and Lang (2003), Doukas and Kan (2006), and 
Gande et al. (2009). However, as discussed by Tsao et al. (2016) and Wiersema and Bowen (2011), this 
line of empirical research has produced mixed evidence and conflicting conclusions. Our study brings a 
new yet relevant perspective to this literature. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to elucidate the 
presence of heightened tail risk in the equity returns of multinational firms relative to domestic firms, and 
especially among firms in which agency costs are likely to be higher due to weaker governance. We 
therefore offer significant new insights that should hold value for scholars interested in understanding the 
implications of heightened agency problems in multinational firms. Second, our study adds to the growing 
literature on tail risk in equity markets. Recent studies of firm-specific crash risk have successfully identified 
several firm characteristics and corporate activities that predict future crash risk. Our study identifies an 
observable firm characteristics, i.e., whether a firm is multinational or domestic, with a robust empirical 
relation to crash risk and also provides evidence on the extent to which certain corporate governance 
mechanisms affect this relation, which should help to further inform future empirical and theoretical 
research on bad news hoarding and crash risk. Finally, the findings of our study should have value for 
various market participants and practitioners. For example, the empirical evidence of Mitton and Vorkink 
(2007) suggests that skewness in individual security returns, which is determined by the probability of 
extreme returns, influences investors’ portfolio decisions, while recent studies by Boyer et al. (2010) and 
Conrad et al. (2013) suggest that idiosyncratic skewness is a priced risk factor in the cross-section of 
expected stock returns. In addition, Xiong et al. (2016) conclude that investors concerned with the mean, 
variance, and skewness of portfolio returns can benefit from more accurate forecasts of skewness of 
individual assets in a portfolio. We show that multinationality is a significant predictor of future idiosyncratic 
return skewness, thus our findings should be particularly useful to investors and practitioners interested in 
developing valuation or portfolio decision models that explicitly incorporate ex ante forecasts of skewness. 
Another practical arena where our work is relevant is the options market for individual stocks, since option 
values depend on the likelihood of extreme returns (Bakshi et al., 1997; Pan, 2002).  Our findings should 
therefore be of interest to market participants and practitioners interested in developing practically useful 
option pricing models that take account of variation in expected crash risk across individual stocks.   
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The second (next) section discusses related literature and 
presents our empirical hypotheses. The third section discusses our data and methodology. The fourth 
section discusses our empirical results and the last section concludes. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
As discussed by Kothari et al. (2009), managers typically possess superior private information relative to 
outside investors and can exercise significant discretion over the flow of information to capital markets, and 
in particular over how quickly or slowly certain types of firm-specific information are communicated to 
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investors. Managers’ tendency to withhold bad news stems from a standard agency problem where 
managerial disclosure preferences are not aligned with those of shareholders, who are presumed to prefer 
timely disclosures. Kothari et al. (2009) discuss various factors that can incent managers to delay the 
release of bad news for prolonged periods, including concerns about current-period performance-based 
compensation, prospects for promotion, future employment, post-retirement benefits such as directorships, 
and the potential for termination. In addition, non-monetary incentives, such as empire building, perquisite 
consumption, and the desire to maintain the esteem of peers, could also motivate managers to conceal and 
withhold negative private information (Ball, 2009). Survey evidence from Graham et al. (2005) also 
suggests managers delay the release of bad news in hopes that subsequent (positive) events will allow 
them to “bury” the bad news. 
Our first hypothesis is based on the confluence of arguments and findings from two separate strands of 
literature. The first is the recent literature on firm-specific crash risk, which has its origins in the theory of Jin 
and Myers (2006). In Jin and Myers (2006), managers withhold and accumulate bad news up to some 
threshold level, at which point it becomes too costly or difficult for the manager to continue. When this 
threshold is reached, the accumulated bad news is revealed to the market all at once, resulting in a large 
crash in the stock price. Based on the Jin and Myers (2006) rationale that bad news hoarding engenders 
stock price crashes, recent empirical studies attempting to identify factors that predict firm-specific crash 
risk have focused on corporate activities or firm characteristics that exacerbate (or mitigate) information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and investors, including earnings management 
(Hutton et al., 2009), aggressive tax avoidance strategies (Kim et al., 2011a), stock option compensation 
(Kim et al., 2011b), stable institutional ownership (Callen and Fang, 2013, An and Zhang, 2013), corporate 
social responsibility (Kim et al., 2014), and the religiosity of the area where a firm is headquartered (Callen 
and Fang, 2015a).2  
The second strand of literature we draw from in order to formulate our main empirical hypothesis spans the 
fields of international business, accounting, and finance. This literature suggests that internationalization of 
a firm’s operations gives rise to greater information asymmetry between managers and investors. This can 
occur through multiple channels. First, multinational firms are more organizationally complex and typically 
have multiple subsidiaries or business segments located in foreign countries. In the U.S., firms are required 
to disclose, on a regular basis, large amounts of detailed, aggregated information regarding the firm’s 
financial condition and performance (e.g., income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements, etc.). 
However, the rules governing reporting of individual geographic segments require far less disclosure of 
segment-specific information. Thus, while investors can observe the aggregate cash flows, liabilities, 
operating costs, current and long-term assets, etc., of the firm as a whole, they typically cannot observe the 
same set of detailed information for the individual foreign (and domestic) segments of a multinational firm. 
This information aggregation problem can result in substantial information asymmetry between managers 
and outside shareholders (Gilson et al., 2001, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999, Bushman et al., 
2004, Liu and Lai, 2012).  Second, investors typically have more knowledge about their home country than 
about foreign countries, thus it stands to reason that investors will tend to be less informed about a firm’s 
foreign operations than its domestic operations (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). In addition, differences in 
cultures, customs, languages, competitors, regulations, and political systems across different countries 
make it more difficult and costly for investors to become knowledgeable about foreign business 
environments, which in turn diminishes investors’ incentives and ability to monitor a firm’s foreign 
operations, thus widening the asymmetric information gap between investors and managers. Empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that information asymmetry is higher in multinational firms is provided by 
Duru and Reeb (2002), who find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are systematically less accurate for 
multinational firms than domestic firms. In addition, evidence presented by Thomas (1999), Callen et al. 
(2005), and Khurana et al. (2003) indicates that investors and analysts systematically underestimate the 
                                                             
2 Using samples of public firms in China, Xu et al. (2014) find that crash risk is associated with excess managerial perk consumption, 
while Yuan et al. (2016) finds that crash risk is higher when directors and officers are protected from financial liability via liability 
insurance.  
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persistence of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) and Callen et al. (2005) conclude that investors do so 
because of a lack of understanding of firms’ foreign operations due in part to poor disclosure.   
Numerous studies suggest that greater information asymmetry in multinational firms gives rise to greater 
agency costs via greater conflicts of interest between owners and managers, including Lee and Kwok 
(1988), Geringer et al. (1989), Mitchell et al. (1992), Nohria and Ghoshal (1994), Burgman (1996), Hitt et al. 
(1997), Sanders and Carpenter (1998), Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001), Denis et al. (2002), Tihanyi et al. 
(2003), Bushman et al. (2004), Lee et al. (2008), Black et al. (2014), and Tsao et al. (2016). When 
investors are less informed about the firm and the activities of its managers, they are less equipped to 
effectively monitor managers’ actions and assess managers’ performance. This gives rise to greater 
opportunities for managers to engage in self-serving actions that are not in the best interest of 
shareholders. As observed by Kothari et al. (2009), bad new hoarding is, in and of itself, a self-serving 
action that conflicts with the interests of shareholders, since shareholders prefer timely disclosures. The 
preceding discussion suggests that more severe information asymmetry in multinational firms should 
facilitate managers’ ability to hoard bad news for extended periods. Moreover, Black et al. (2014) point out 
that the greater complexity and information asymmetry in multinational firms facilitates self-serving 
resource diversion by managers, such as excess perquisite consumption or empire building. As discussed 
by Kim et al. (2011a), Xu et al. (2016), and Ball (2009), managers engaged in substantial resource diverting 
activities for prolonged periods have incentives to conceal their actions and the resulting negative 
consequences, which is a form of bad news hoarding. Thus, the preceding discussion suggests that 
managers of multinational firms have greater opportunities to engage in bad news hoarding, as well as 
greater opportunities to engage in self-serving activities that incentivize bad news hoarding. This leads to 
our first formal hypothesis.  
H1: Crash risk is higher among multinational firms than domestic firms, all else equal.  
Bushman et al. (2004), Luo (2005), Jiraporn et al. (2006), Gande et al. (2009), and Tsao et al. (2016) argue 
that heightened agency problems in multinational firms can be mitigated by stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms. Mangers of multinational firms with stronger corporate governance should be subject to 
greater levels of monitoring and discipline, which should help to attenuate agency problems, while 
managers of multinationals with weak corporate governance mechanisms should have greater 
opportunities to engage in bad news hoarding and/or the resource diverting activities that incentivize bad 
news hoarding.  We therefore expect the impact of multinationality on crash risk to be attenuated for firms 
with stronger governance. This leads to our second formal hypothesis.  
H2: The (positive) difference in crash risk between multinational and domestic firms is attenuated by 
stronger monitoring from the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, all else equal. 
Research and Methods 
Data and Sample 
Our data sources include the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for stock prices, returns, 
shares outstanding, and trading volumes, Compustat for financial accounting and geographic segment 
data, the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) Governance and Directors databases3 for data on 
governance provisions and boards of directors, and Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings database 
for data on shareholdings of institutional investors. Our baseline sample consists of firms that are covered 
by CRSP and Compustat during fiscal years 1987-20114  with publicly traded common stock (CRSP share 
codes of 10, 11, or 12) and headquarters located in the United States (Compustat Foreign Incorporate 
Code = USA). We exclude firms-years with non-positive book assets and firm-years with fewer than thirty 
non-missing weekly returns in CRSP. We also require that firms have the necessary information in CRSP 
                                                             
3 The ISS databases were formerly known as RiskMetrics and IRRC.  
4 We start our sample period in 1987 because the data items required to construct several of the variables in our analysis are 
unavailable before this, including discretionary accruals (Hutton et al., 2009) and long-run effective tax rates (Kim et al., 2011a). In 
addition, ISS data on governance provisions and boards of directors are available starting in 1990 and 1997, respectively. 
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and Compustat required for the construction of our baseline control variables, which are described in detail 
in a later subsection entitled “Baseline Control Variables.” After applying these data screens we are left with 
a baseline sample of 104,929 firm-years.5  
Estimation of Firm-Specific Returns and Crash Risk Measures 
We estimate firm-specific (idiosyncratic) weekly returns for each firm-year in the sample using a five-factor 
model that includes the three factors of Fama and French (1993), the momentum factor of Carhart (1997), 
and an industry factor:  
ܴ௜,ఛ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ܴ௠,ఛ + ݏ௜ܵܯܤఛ+ℎ௜ܪܯܮఛ + ݑ௜ܷܯܦఛ + ߛ௜ܫܰܦ௜,ఛ + ߝ௜,ఛ                             (1) 
where, for firm i in  week ߬, Ri is the weekly stock return of firm i, Rm is the weekly return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index, SMB, HML, and UMD are the weekly returns on the Small-Minus-Big, High-Minus-
Low, and Up-Minus-Down portfolios that capture size, book-to-market, and return momentum effects, 
respectively, and INDi is the weekly return on a value-weighted index that includes all firms in firm i’s Fama-
French industry.6 The residual from Equation (1) is defined as the weekly firm-specific return in week ߬.   
Following Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), we estimate Equation (1) separately for each 
firm-year and define firm-specific log-returns as the natural logarithm of one plus the firm-specific return. 
Firm i is defined as experiencing a stock price crash in a given week if the firm-specific log-return is 3.09 or 
more standard deviations below firm i’s mean weekly firms-specific log-return during that fiscal year. The 
cutoff of 3.09 standard deviations is chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution.7 As 
in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), our primary response variable of interest, denoted as 
CRASH, is a binary variable that equals one if a firm experiences a stock price crash in the given fiscal 
year and zero otherwise. As in prior studies of crash risk, our empirical analysis uses information available 
in year t to predict crash risk in year t+1. Thus, measurement of our explanatory variables begins in the first 
year of our sample period, 1987, while the measurement of our crash risk variables begins in 1988. 
Table 1 reports the frequency of firm-specific crashes for each year, starting in 1988 and ending in 2011. 
As reported at the bottom of Table 1, 18.5% of firm-years in the sample contain a crash. As noted by Kim et 
al. (2011a, 2011b), the frequency of crashes is generally larger in the 2000’s than in the 1990’s and peaks 
in 2008, which may be a by-product of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Table 1 also reports the mean firm-
specific and raw stock returns during crash weeks by year and for the total sample. On average, stock 
prices fall by 23.5% on an adjusted (firm-specific) basis and 24.5% on an unadjusted (raw) basis during the 
week of a crash. 
We check the robustness of our conclusions using two alternative measures of crash risk derived by Chen 
et al. (2001) and employed by Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015a, 2015b), and An 
and Zhang (2013). We briefly describe these variables below. Definitions of these variables as well as all 
other variables used in our empirical analyses can also be found in the appendix. The first alternative crash 
risk measure that we use is NCSKEW, which is defined as negative one multiplied by the skewness of the 
firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns during the given fiscal year. Skewness is computed as the sample 
third central moment divided by the sample standard deviation cubed. This measure captures the 
magnitude of leftward skewness in the distribution, with larger (or less negative) values of NCSKEW  
                                                             
5 Throughout our paper, any references to “years” denote fiscal years (not calendar years) unless otherwise stated.  
6 We use the updated industry classification scheme of Fama and French (1997) that groups firms into 49 industries. Kenneth French 
has generously provided the algorithm for mapping SIC codes to the 49 Fama-French industries on his website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.   
7 Under the assumption that firm-specific weekly log-returns are independently normally distributed, this definition of a crash implies 
roughly a 5% probability of observing a crash for a given firm in a given year. As shown in Table 1, the incidence of crashes in our 
sample is considerably higher than this, which is not surprising given that weekly log-returns are not normally distributed (although 
they do provide a closer approximation to normality than non-logged returns). Nonetheless, we use the 0.1% normal distribution cutoff 
as in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b) as a convenient and reasonable means of identifying extreme return 
observations.  
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Table 1: Frequency of Stock Price Crashes and Average Crash Returns 
This table reports the frequency of stock price crashes by fiscal year for firms in our sample. The table also reports 
average firm-specific and raw stock returns during weeks that contain a crash.  
  Fiscal Year Number  of Firms 
Number of 














1988 3,872 531 13.71% -25.4% -25.6% 
1989 4,142 672 16.22% -25.9% -26.5% 
1990 4,116 853 20.72% -22.8% -24.0% 
1991 4,071 691 16.97% -22.2% -23.4% 
1992 4,021 685 17.04% -21.1% -22.1% 
1993 4,037 596 14.76% -23.3% -24.5% 
1994 4,732 680 14.37% -23.7% -25.2% 
1995 4,903 628 12.81% -25.5% -26.8% 
1996 5,227 726 13.89% -26.8% -27.5% 
1997 5,326 777 14.59% -29.2% -29.4% 
1998 5,414 958 17.69% -27.0% -27.1% 
1999 5,243 827 15.77% -26.7% -28.5% 
2000 5,096 997 19.56% -20.0% -20.6% 
2001 4,783 966 20.20% -18.4% -19.6% 
2002 4,713 1,071 22.72% -18.3% -19.5% 
2003 4,505 856 19.00% -17.7% -19.0% 
2004 4,290 911 21.24% -19.6% -22.1% 
2005 4,089 925 22.62% -28.5% -30.0% 
2006 3,965 924 23.30% -26.5% -24.9% 
2007 3,874 911 23.52% -18.6% -19.5% 
2008 3,793 1,080 28.47% -18.6% -20.6% 
2009 3,706 770 20.78% -23.3% -24.3% 
2010 3,634 699 19.24% -18.9% -19.7% 
2011 3,377 724 21.44% -18.7% -20.7% 
Total 104,929 19,458 18.50% -23.5% -24.5% 
 
indicating greater crash risk. The second alternative measure of crash risk that we use is “down-to-up” 
volatility, DUVOL, which captures asymmetric volatilities between below-mean and above-mean returns. 
For a given firm-year, DUVOL equals the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns 
that are below the firm’s mean in that year divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly firm-
specific log-returns that are above the firm’s mean in that year. As with NCSKEW, larger values of DUVOL 
are interpreted as indicating greater crash risk. 
Table 2 reports sample descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, 25th percentile, and 75th 
percentile) for NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1, as well as for all other variables used in our analysis. Since our 
empirical analysis uses information from year t to predict crash risk in year t+1, throughout we subscript our 
crash risk measures with the t+1 subscript.  As reported in Table 2, the sample mean and median of 
NCSKEWt+1 is -0.174, indicating that weekly firm-specific log-returns are positively skewed for the typical 
firm-year in our sample. This is consistent with prior studies (Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b, Callen and Fang, 
2013). The mean and median of DUVOLt+1 are both below one, which indicates a tendency toward greater 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample Firms 
This table reports summary statistics of variables used in our empirical analysis. The unit of observation is a 
firm-year (fiscal). All variables are defined in the appendix.  




Percentile    N 
Crash Risk Measures       
CRASHt+1 0.185 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 104,929 
NCSKEWt+1 -0.174 0.882 -0.600 -0.174 0.234 104,929 
DUVOLt+1 0.983 0.495 0.711 0.900 1.142 104,929 
       
Multinational Variable       
MNt 0.328 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 104,929 
       
Corporate Governance Variables      
SH_RIGHTSt 3.528 1.420 3.000 3.000 5.000 29,828 
BOARD_INDt 0.669 0.210 0.571 0.714 0.818 21,003 
IIO_STABILITYt 0.0112 0.002
6 
0.0102 0.0117 0.0130 79,511 
       
Baseline Control Variables       
SIZEt 5.402 2.128 3.838 5.278 6.879 104,929 
BMt 0.683 0.618 0.309 0.552 0.882 104,929 
LEVERAGEt 0.220 0.206 0.039 0.178 0.343 104,929 
ROAt -0.034 0.224 -0.022 0.019 0.062 104,929 
DTURNt 0.003 0.075 -0.018 0.000 0.019 104,929 
NCSKEWt -0.156 0.758 -0.578 -0.169 0.226 104,929 
SIGMAt 0.063 0.039 0.035 0.053 0.081 104,929 
ALPHAt 0.001 0.011 -0.004 0.001 0.006 104,929 
      
Additional Control Variables      
DIS_ACCRUALSt 0.243 0.250 0.087 0.164 0.302 87,448 
LRETRt  0.348 0.302 0.135 0.302 0.416 90,078 
        
Identifying Multinational Firms 
Beginning in 1977, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules governing geographic 
segment reporting require U.S. firms to report limited audited financial information for individual foreign 
segments (those located outside the U.S.) that account for 10% or more of the firm’s total consolidated 
sales, profits, or assets. This information is reported in the Compustat Geographic Segment files and 
includes segment-specific sales and identifiable assets as well as other items that may be voluntarily 
reported by firms, such as segment-specific earnings and capital expenditures.8 Following Denis et al. 
(2002), Gande et al. (2009), Tsao et al. (2016), Liu and Lao (2012), and Jiraporn et al. (2006), we define a 
firm as multinational in fiscal year t if it reports sales by one or more foreign segments that year. For the 
purposes of testing our hypotheses regarding differences in crash risk across multinational and domestic 
firms, we construct an indicator variable, MNt, which equals one if the firm is multinational in year t and zero 
otherwise.    
Table 2 reports sample descriptive statistics for MNt. Since it is an indicator variable, the sample mean of 
MNt (0.328) indicates that 32.8% of firms-years in the sample correspond to multinational firms. As would 
be expected, a year-by-year tabulation (unreported for brevity) reveals that the proportion of multinational 
                                                             
8 Prior to 1998, firms were required to report segment-specific sales, identifiable assets, and earnings for each foreign segment. From 
1998 onward, firms are only required to report sales and identifiable assets for each foreign segment. A peculiarity of the Compustat 
Geographic Segment files is that segment-specific identifiable assets are consistently missing for most firms, which could be due to a 
lack of standardization in how and where this information is reported in annual reports across different firms. Segment-specific sales, 
however, are consistently non-missing in the Compustat Geographic Segment files, which is why researchers using this database 
typically rely on sales by foreign segments to identify multinational firms.  
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firms has risen significantly over time, from 24% of sample firms in 1987 to 45% of sample firms in 2010. 
This trend is consistent with what prior studies have documented.  
Corporate Governance Variables 
We consider three important aspects of corporate governance that have been extensively studied in the 
finance and accounting literature: shareholder rights, the extent to which a firm’s board is independent of 
top management, and institutional ownership.  
We use the ISS Governance database to construct our measure of shareholder rights, which is based on 
the widely used “entrenchment index” developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). In their seminal 
study, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) develop an index of shareholder rights comprised of twenty-four 
unique governance provisions included in the ISS database that affect the balance of power between a 
firm’s managers and shareholders. These include provisions that managers can use to block unwanted 
takeovers, even when they are desired by a majority of shareholders, and, more generally, provisions that 
prevent a majority of shareholders from imposing their will on management. Gompers et al. (2003) show 
that firms with higher shareholder rights, as measured by lower values of their governance index, have 
significantly higher valuations and long-run stock returns. Bebchuk et al. (2009) extend the study of 
Gompers et al. (2003) by examining individually the twenty-four unique provisions that comprise the 
Gompers et al. (2003) governance index. They find that six of the twenty-four provisions are strongly 
associated with firm value and stock return performance, while the remaining 18 provisions in the Gompers 
et al. (2003) governance index are not. These six provisions include four constitutional provisions that limit 
the ability of shareholders to impose their will on management (staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments), and two explicit takeover prevention provisions (poison pills and golden parachutes). Based 
on these findings, Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct their “entrenchment index” by adding one point for each 
of the six provisions a firm has in place. The entrenchment index therefore ranges from zero to six, with 
higher values corresponding to lower shareholder rights.  
We construct a measure that is increasing in shareholder rights, denoted as SH_RIGHTSt, which equals 
six minus the firm’s entrenchment index in year t.9 SH_RIGHTSt therefore ranges from zero to six, with 
higher values corresponding to higher shareholder rights.10 Managers and directors of firms with lower 
shareholder rights are viewed as being more insulated from the discipline of a hostile takeover or the 
activist efforts of shareholders, thus higher levels of shareholder rights correspond to better governance. In 
addition to having lower stock returns and lower valuations (Bebchuk et al., 2009, Chi and Lee, 2010, 
Cremers and Ferrell, 2014), empirical evidence suggests that firms with lower shareholder rights make 
more value destroying acquisitions (Harford et al., 2012, Masulis et al., 2007). Furthemore, Jiraporn et al. 
(2006) find that weaker shareholder rights is associated with substantially lower firm values in highly 
diversified firms, while Dittmar and Marhrt-Smith (2007), in their analysis of the market’s valuation of firms’ 
cash holdings, find that a dollar of cash held by a firm with strong shareholder rights has roughly twice the 
market value of a dollar of cash held by a firm with weak shareholder rights. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) conclude that weaker shareholder rights are associated with lower cash holdings valuations 
because managers of such firms are more likely to waste cash. The ISS Governance database begins in 
1990 and covers roughly 30% of the firms in our sample during that year, with coverage generally 
                                                             
9 We base our measure of shareholder rights on the entrenchment index of Bebchuck et al. (2009) rather than the governance index 
of Gompers et al. (2003) because Bebchuck et al. find that the six provisions comprising the entrenchment index are the most 
consequential with respect to their impact on shareholder value and because some of the twenty-four provisions comprising the 
Gompers et al. governance index are not reported in the ISS database after 2006, while all six provisions comprising the Bebchuk et 
al. entrenchment index are.   
10 We test H2 by regressing measures of crash risk on interactions between our governance measures and our indicator variable 
denoting multinationality. The coefficients on interactions in a regression are most easily interpreted when the variables have been 
constructed as intuitively as possible. We therefore construct all our governance variables so that they have minimum values of zero 
and are increasing with better governance.   
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increasing over time to about 40% of our sample in 2010.11 Thus, our regressions that include 
SH_RIGHTSt will have a lower number of reported observations than that of the full baseline sample.   
The next corporate governance variable that we consider is the fraction of independent outsiders on the 
board of directors. We use the ISS Directors database to construct our measure of board independence, 
BOARD_INDt, which equals the number of independent directors (as defined by ISS) divided by the total 
number of directors on the firm’s board in year t. ISS classifies a director as independent if he/she is not 
employed by the firm in any other capacity and has no material connections to the firm other than holding a 
board seat. Directors who are captured by management, especially those employed directly under the 
CEO, face significant conflicts of interest that reduce their incentives to effectively monitor the firm’s 
managers. Independent directors are presumed not to be hampered by such conflicts of interest, and are 
thus viewed as being more effective monitors. Empirical evidence indicates that firms with more 
independent boards make more voluntary disclosures (Lim et al., 2007), are less likely to commit corporate 
fraud (Beasley, 1996, Uzun et al., 2004), and less likely to manipulate reported earnings (Klein, 2002,  
Osma, 2008). Furthermore, Weisbach (1988) finds that CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance 
when the board is dominated by independent outsiders, while other works suggest that firms with more 
independent boards make better decisions with respect to tender offer bids (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and 
the adoption of poison pills (Brickley et al., 1994). Our measure of board independence, BOARD_INTt, 
ranges from zero to one, with higher values corresponding to greater board independence and more 
effective monitoring. The ISS Directors database begins in 1996 and covers roughly 23% of the firms in our 
baseline sample during that year, with coverage generally increasing over time to 39% of our sample in 
2010.    
Our final governance variable, which measures the stability of a firm’s institutional ownership, is based on 
Callen and Fang (2013) and is computed using data from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings 
database. Callen and Fang (2013) hypothesize that stable (or long-term) institutional investors are more 
likely to be concerned with long-term value maximization, rather than short-term accounting profits, and 
thus more likely to have strong monitoring incentives, which should lessen bad news hoarding and crash 
risk. On the other hand, investors focused on short-term trading profits (transient investors) should have 
little or no incentives to monitor management. Callen and Fang (2013) further argue that transient 
institutional investors may even exacerbate bad news hoarding and crash risk due to greater pressure on 
managers to maximize short-term earnings at the expense of long-term value. Using a measure originally 
developed by Elyasiani et al. (2010), which measures the volatility, or instability, of a firm’s institutional 
ownership, Callen and Fang (2013) document a significant positive relationship between the instability of a 
firm’s institutional ownership and one-year-ahead crash risk, leading them to conclude that more stable 
institutional ownership mitigates crash risk, while less stable institutional ownership exacerbates crash risk.  
For the purposes of our study, we begin by constructing the variable used by Callen and Fang (2013), 
denoted as StdI in their study,12 which is defined as the average standard deviation of quarterly institutional 
shareholding proportions across all institutional investors in the firm over a 5-year period (year t-4 to year t). 
Specifically, for a given firm i in fiscal year t, StdI is computed using data on institutional shareholdings over 
the twenty quarters comprising years t-4 to t as follows: 
ܵݐ݀ܫ௜ = ∑ ܵݐ݀(݌௜,௤
௝ )/ܬ௜
௃೔
௝ୀଵ                                                                    (2) 
where ݌௜,௤
௝  is the proportion of firm i held by institutional investor j at quarter q (q = 1, 2, …, 20), ܵݐ݀(݌௜,௤
௝ ) is 
the time series standard deviation of institutional investor j’s quarterly shareholding proportions in firm i 
during the twenty quarters comprising fiscal years t-4 to t, and ܬ௜ is the number of institutional investors in 
firm i. The rationale for this measure is based on the idea that institutional investors focused on short-term 
trading profits should exhibit more volatile shareholding proportions, while investors focused on long-term 
value maximization should exhibit less volatile shareholding proportions. StdI is therefore viewed as an 
                                                             
11 Between 1990 and 1997, the ISS Governance database covers firms in the S&P 1500. After 1997, coverage is expanded to include 
some smaller and mid-size firms.  
12 See Equation (1) in Callen and Fang (2013). 
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inverse measure of a firm’s institutional ownership stability. To obtain a measure that is increasing in 
institutional ownership stability, we first winsorize StdI at the 1st and 99th sample percentiles as in Callen 
and Fang (2013) and then perform the following transformation to arrive at our measure of institutional 
ownership stability for each firm in the sample: 
IIO_STABILITYi,t = max(StdI) - StdIi,t                                                       (3) 
where max(StdI) is the maximum value of StdI across all firm-years in the sample. As with our other 
corporate governance measures, IIO_STABILITY has a sample minimum value of zero. As previously 
discussed, Callen and Fang (2013) find that firm’s with more stable institutional ownership have lower one-
year-ahead crash risk. In addition, McCahery et al. (2016), in their survey of institutional investors, provide 
evidence that long-term institutional investors actively monitor and discipline managers through “behind the 
scenes” interventions, which lends further support to the notion that managers of firms with more stable 
institutional ownership are subject to better monitoring.  
Baseline Control Variables 
We derive our set of control variables from Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2011a, 
2011b), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015a, 2015b), and An and Zhang (2013). We briefly define the control 
variables below and report standard summary statistics for these variables in Table 2. All monetary 
variables are measured in millions of 2012 U.S. dollars using the consumer price index to adjust for 
inflation. To mitigate the potential influence of extreme outliers in our regressions, we follow Callen and 
Fang (2013, 2015a, 2015b) and winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles, although we 
have verified in untabulated results that our conclusions hold without winsorizing the control variables. 
Detailed definitions of each control variable can also be found in the appendix.  
Our baseline set of controls includes the following variables: SIZEt, BMt, LEVERAGEt, ROAt, DTURNt, 
NCSKEWt, SIGMAt, and ALPHAt. SIZEt is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm’s 
common equity at the close of fiscal year t. BMt is the book value of the firm’s common equity divided by 
the market value of common equity and LEVERAGEt is the firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus short-term 
debt) divided by the book value of total assets, all measured at the close of year t. ROAt is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the book value of total assets at the close of year t, which measures the 
firm’s accounting profitability. Prior studies have generally found that crash risk is positively related to firm 
size and negatively related to the book-to-market ratio. Findings regarding measures of accounting 
profitability are mixed, with some studies finding that more profitable firms have higher future crash risk 
(Callen and Fang, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) and others finding that more profitable firms have lower future 
crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b). Similarly, findings regarding the relation between 
leverage and crash risk are also mixed in prior studies.13 DTURNt is the detrended average monthly share 
turnover in year t, which equals the average monthly share turnover during year t minus the average 
monthly share turnover during year t-1, where monthly share turnover is calculated as monthly trading 
volume (number of shares) divided by the total number of shares outstanding during the month. This 
variable is viewed as a proxy for differences of opinion among investors (Chen et al., 2001). The variable 
NCSKEWt equals negative one multiplied by the skewness coefficient of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-
returns in year t. The variable SIGMAt is the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns 
in year t. DTURNt and NCSKEWt generally exhibit a positive relationship with one-year-ahead crash risk in 
prior studies (Chen et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b; Callen and Fang, 2013, 2015a, 2015b). Prior 
studies have documented mixed results regarding the relation between crash risk and SIGMAt.
14 ALPHAt is 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the estimated intercept from the firm’s five-factor model 
                                                             
13 Hutton et al. (2009) and Callen and Fang (2013) find that leverage is significantly and negatively related to crash risk. In other 
studies, however, the coefficient on leverage is either significantly positive or insignificant in many cases (Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b, An 
and Zhang, 2013).  
14 Chen et al. (2001) find that future crash risk, as measured by NCSKEW, is negatively related to past return volatility, as do An and 
Zhang (2013) using multiple measures of crash risk. On the other hand, Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Callen and Fang (2015b) find 
that crash risk (using multiple measures) is positively related to past return volatility, while Callen and Fang (2013, 2015a) report 
mixed results across different measures of crash risk. 
Boehme & May / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 5 No 4, 2016 
ISSN: 2147-4486 






estimated during year t (ߙ from Equation (1)). This variable measures the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return 
performance during year t. Chen et al. (2001) find that crash risk is higher among firms with higher past 
stock return performance.  
Additional Control Variables 
In some of our regressions, we also include variables that capture the firm’s earnings management and tax 
avoidance activities as additional controls. Hutton et al. (2009) argue that reported earnings that include 
large (in absolute value) discretionary accruals, which managers can use to manipulate earnings, are less 
transparent and therefore more difficult for investors to assess. They therefore hypothesize that crash risk 
should be greater among firms with larger (in absolute value) discretionary accruals. Their findings 
indicated that crash risk increases at a decreasing rate as the absolute value of past discretionary accruals 
increases, i.e., crash risk is positively related to the absolute value of discretionary accruals and negatively 
related to the square of the absolute value of discretionary accruals. We therefore include in some of our 
regressions the variable DIS_ACCRUALSt, which is defined as the sum of the absolute value of annual 
discretionary accruals over the last three fiscal years (years t, t-1, and t-2). This variable is constructed 
exactly as in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a) using the modified Jones model of discretionary 
accruals originally developed by Dechow et al. (1995).15  Since Hutton et al. (2009) find that the positive 
relation between crash risk and DIS_ACCRUALSt declines at higher levels of DIS_ACCRUALSt, we also 
include the square of this variable in our regressions. Kim et al. (2011a) argue that aggressive tax 
avoidance activities, like complex tax shelters, can create opportunities for managers to conceal negative 
information and mislead investors. They find empirical support for their hypothesis that tax avoidance is 
positively associated with crash risk. Following Kim et al. (2011a), in some of our regressions 
specifications, we include the variable LRETRt, which is a measure of the firm’s long-run effective tax rate. 
LRETRt is defined as in Dyreng et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2011a) and is computed as total taxes paid 
during the last five fiscal years (years t-4 to t) divided by total pre-tax income net of special items during the 
same period. The Compustat data items used to construct the variables DIS_ACCRUALSt and LRETRt are 
missing for a nontrivial portion of firm-years in our sample, hence the regression specifications that include 
these variables have fewer observations than our baseline specification. 
Regression Models 
We test H1 in a multivariate setting using the following regression model:  
ܥܴܣܵܪ௜,௧ାଵ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܯ ௜ܰ,௧ + ∑ ߙ௤(ݍ
௧௛  ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧)
௠
௤ୀଶ + ߤ௜,௧                                  (4) 
where for firm i in fiscal year t, CRASHi,t+1 is the previously defined binary variable denoting whether the 
firm crashes in year t+1, MNi,t is the previously defined indicator variable denoting whether the firm is 
multinational or domestic in year t, and the control variables are previously defined. As in Hutton et al. 
(2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), we estimate this model using a logistic regression that includes year 
dummies and industry dummies corresponding to the 49 Fama-French industries based on the updated 
industry classification scheme of Fama and French (1997). A positive and statistically significant estimate 
of the coefficient ߙଵ indicates that stock price crashes are more likely to occur among multinational firms 
than domestic firms, thus we interpret a positive and significant estimate of ߙଵ in equation (4) as evidence 
in favor of H1. 
We test H2 by augmenting the right hand side of Equation (4) with the previously defined corporate 
governance variables, SH_RIGHTS, BOARD_IND, and IIO_STABILITY, and their interactions with MN, 
which produces the following regression specification:  
ܥܴܣܵܪ௜,௧ାଵ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܯ ௜ܰ,௧ + ߙଶܯ ௜ܰ,௧ × ܵܪ_ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵ,௧  + ߙଷܯ ௜ܰ,௧ × ܤܱܣܴܦ_ܫܰܦ௜,௧ +




௤ୀ଼ + ߤ௜,௧                                                                                                       (5) 
                                                             
15 This variable is denoted as OPAQUE in Hutton et al. (2009) and ACCM in Kim et al. (2011a).  
Boehme & May / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 5 No 4, 2016 
ISSN: 2147-4486 






This specification allows the relation between crash risk and multinationality to vary across different levels 
of the corporate governance variables, SH_RIGHTS, BOARD_IND, and IIO_STABILITY. H2 predicts that 
the positive relation between crash risk and multinationality is attenuated by stronger governance, thus H2 
implies significantly negative estimates of ߙଶ, ߙଷ, and ߙସ.  
As previously discussed, we check the robustness of our conclusions using two alternative measures of 
one-year-ahead crash risk, NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1.When these crash risk measures are used as the 
dependent variable, we estimate the regression models with OLS that include industry and year dummies, 
as in Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015) and An and Zhang (2013).  
Results and Discussion 
Univariate Comparisons 
We begin our empirical analysis by performing univariate comparisons of crash risk across multinational 
and domestic firms. In Table 3, we first compare the proportion of firms with a crash in year t+1 (CRASHt+1 
= 1) across multinational (MNt = 1) and domestic firms (MNt = 0). As reported in Table 3, domestic firms 
exhibit an unconditional one-year-ahead crash probability of 0.175, indicating that 17.5% of the firm-years 
classified as domestic experience a crash in the following year. In contrast, multinational firms exhibit an 
unconditional one-year-ahead crash probability of 0.207 (or 20.7%), yielding a difference between the two 
subsamples of 3.2 percentage points. This difference is highly significant (z-statistic = 12.63) and 
corresponds to an 18% (0.032/0.175) rise in the probability of crashing. Table 3 also reports mean and 
median values of our alternative crash risk measures, NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1, across the two 
subsamples. The mean (median) values of NCSKEWt+1 are -0.209 (-0.119) for domestic firms and -0.103 (-
0.124) for multinational firms. The difference in means (and medians) is highly significant, indicating that 
multinational firms have significantly higher crash risk as measured by NCSKEWt+1. Likewise, multinational 
firms have significantly higher mean and median values of DUVOLt+1. Overall, the results of these 
univariate tests indicate that, on an unconditional basis, one-year-ahead crash risk is indeed higher among 
multinational firms. 
Table 3: Multinationality and Crash Risk: Univariate Comparisons 
This table compares measures of one-year-ahead crash risk across multinational firms (MNt = 1) and domestic 
firms (MNt = 0).  All variables are defined in the appendix. We use a two-proportion z-test to test for statistical 
significance of the difference in the proportion of firms with a crash. We use a two-sample t test (Wilcoxon test) to 
test for statistical significance of the difference in mean (median) values of NCSKEWt+1, and DUVOLt+1. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance of the difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. 
 Multinational Firms  (MNt = 1) 
Domestic Firms 
(MNt = 0) 
Test statistic 
(difference) 
No. of Firm-Years 34,455 70,474  
Proportion of firm-years with 
a crash in year t+1 (CRASHt+1 = 1) 
0.207 0.175 12.63*** 
    Mean of NCSKEWt+1 -0.103 -0.209 18.59*** 
Median of NCSKEWt+1 -0.124 -0.199 19.83*** 
    
Mean of DUVOLt+1 1.009 0.971 12.33*** 
Median of DUVOLt+1 0.927 0.887 18.69*** 
 
Regression Analysis 
In the first two models reported in Table 4, we perform formal tests of H1 with logistic regressions that 
model the probability of a stock price crash as a function of whether the firm is multinational or domestic 
and the previously described set of control variables. The table reports coefficients along with test statistics 
in parentheses, which are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering by firm.   
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After controlling for known predictors of crash risk, we find robust evidence that multinational firms are 
indeed more likely to crash than domestic firms. Model (1) in Table 4 reports the results of a logistic 
regression of CRASHt+1 on MNt and the baseline control variables. The coefficient on MNt is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that one-year-ahead crash risk is higher among 
multinational firms than among domestic firms. In model (2) of Table 4, which includes the additional 
control variables, DIS_ACCRUALSt and LRETRt, we again observe a positive coefficient on MNt that is 
now significant at the 1% level. The results from models (1) and (2) in Table 4 therefore provide evidence in 
support of H1.  
Table 4: Multinationality and Crash Risk: Regression Analysis 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is CRASHt+1,  
NCSKEWt+1 or DUVOLt+1. All variables are defined in the appendix. The unit of observation is a firm-year (fiscal). 
When the dependent variable is CRASHt+1, we use a logistic regression. When the dependent variable is 
NCSKEWt+1 or DUVOLt+1, we use OLS. All regressions include fiscal year dummies and industry dummies 
(coefficients unreported) that correspond to the updated 49 Fama-French industries (Fama and French, 1997). 
Z-statistics (t-statistics) are reported in parentheses below the logistic (OLS) coefficients and are based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
Dependent Variable CRASHt+1    NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)    (5)  (6)   (7)   (8) 
MNt 0.044** 0.063*** 1.377*** 1.503***  0.414*** 0.455***  0.227*** 0.256*** 
 (2.03) (2.66) (3.55) (3.73)  (3.05) (3.11)  (3.26) (3.45) 
MNt x SH_RIGHTSt   -0.072** -0.068**  -0.020** -0.021*  -0.009* -0.010* 
  (-2.52) (-2.20)  (-2.00) (-1.94)  (-1.80) (-1.92) 
MNt x BOARD_INDt   -0.438** -0.506**  -0.185*** -0.201***  -0.089*** -0.101*** 
   (-2.20) (-2.32)  (-2.82) (-2.79)  (-2.59) (-2.66) 
MNt x IIO_STABILITYt   -65.10** -72.30**  -17.36* -19.41*  -10.76** -12.03** 
   (-2.26) (-2.40)  (-1.74) (-1.78)  (-2.09) (-2.16) 
SH_RIGHTSt   0.019 0.012  0.011 0.010  0.001 0.002 
   (0.85) (0.50)  (1.38) (1.19)  (0.33) (0.45) 
BOARD_INDt   0.396*** 0.390**  0.076 0.076  0.043* 0.045 
   (2.58) (2.25)  (1.59) (1.40)  (1.67) (1.55) 
IIIO_STABILITYt   -25.70 -9.739  -14.20 -12.29  -7.544 -6.514 
   (-0.91) (-0.34)  (-1.50) (-1.14)  (-1.59) (-1.19) 
SIZEt 
 
0.014** 0.027*** -0.005 -0.026  0.047*** 0.043***  0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (2.17) (3.63) (-0.22) (-1.07)  (6.05) (5.03)  (4.95) (3.76) 
BMt 
 
-0.087*** -0.075*** -0.089 -0.073  -0.054*** -0.058***  -0.029*** -0.032*** 
(-4.86) (-3.64) (-1.59) (-1.23)  (-2.88) (-2.91)  (-3.11) (-3.13) 
LEVERAGEt 0.087* 0.070 0.138 0.064  0.004 -0.027  0.017 0.002 
(1.91) (1.38) (1.17) (0.50)  (0.09) (-0.56)  (0.76) (0.10) 
ROAt 
 
0.062 0.049 0.807*** 0.847***  0.307*** 0.255***  0.181*** 0.152*** 
(1.33) (0.97) (3.51) (3.54)  (4.18) (3.21)  (4.92) (3.84) 
DTURNt 0.708*** 0.642*** 0.379 0.397  0.210** 0.226**  0.101* 0.107* 
 (6.24) (5.24) (1.44) (1.43)  (2.21) (2.25)  (1.92) (1.93) 
NCSKEWt 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.092*** 0.084***  0.031*** 0.031***  0.014*** 0.013** 
 (12.37) (10.60) (3.52) (2.94)  (3.08) (2.83)  (2.74) (2.47) 
SIGMAt -1.706*** -2.090*** 0.687 0.022  0.963** 0.823*  0.419** 0.374 
(-4.91) (-5.23) (0.61) (0.02)  (2.36) (1.81)  (2.00) (1.63) 
ALPHAt 4.253*** 4.508*** 3.817 4.509  3.853*** 4.153***  1.822*** 2.029*** 
(4.72) (4.49) (1.33) (1.48)  (3.78) (3.82)  (3.39) (3.56) 
DIS_ACCRUALSt  0.480***  0.159   -0.056   -0.040 
 (4.30)  (0.52)   (-0.54)   (-0.75) 
DIS_ACCRUALSt
2  -0.349***  0.140   0.109   0.064 
 (-4.05)  (0.48)   (1.12)   (1.24) 
LRETRt  -0.102***  -0.109   -0.079**   -0.059*** 
 (-3.16)  (-1.11)   (-2.23)   (-3.38) 
           Pseudo R2 / R2  0.018 0.019 0.023 0.024  0.027 0.028  0.027 0.028 
No. of Observations 104,929 77,191 17,253 14,854  17,253 14,854  17,253 14,854 
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In Models (3) and (4) of Table 4, we test H2 by repeating the logistic regressions in models (1) and (2) 
while adding the three corporate governance variables SH_RIGHTSt, BOARD_INDt, and IIO_STABILITYt 
and their interactions with MNt. In both of these models, the coefficient on MNt is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, while the coefficients on the interactions of MNt with SH_RIGHTSt, BOARD_INDt, and 
IIO_STABILITYt are all negative and significant at the 5% level. These findings strongly support H2, since 
they indicate that the positive relation between the probability of a crash and multinationality diminishes as 
the strength of each corporate governance mechanism increases. In models (5) and (6), which include 
NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable, the coefficient on MNt is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
while the coefficients on the interactions of MNt with SH_RIGHTSt, BOARD_INDt, and IIO_STABILITYt are 
all negative and significant at the 10% level or better. We repeat the same two regressions in specifications 
(7) and (8) using DUVOLt+1 as the dependent variable. We again observe positive and highly significant 
coefficient on MNt and negative coefficients on the interactions of MNt with the three governance variables, 
which are significant at the 10% level or better. The results from Table 4 therefore provide robust evidence 
in support of H1 and H2. Summarily, we find that one-year-ahead crash risk is higher among multinational 
firms than domestic firms, all else equal. This positive relation is attenuated by stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms, as measured by stronger shareholder rights, greater board independence, and 
more stable institutional ownership.  
In Table 4, the coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with the findings of 
prior works. SIZEt, DTURNt, NCSKEWt, and ALPHAt have positive and significant coefficients in all or a 
majority of the models, while BMt, has a negative and significant coefficient in a majority of the models.  
These results are in line with Chen et al. (2001), Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), Hutton et al. (2009), Callen and 
Fang (2013, 2015a, 2015b), and An and Zhang (2013).  
The coefficient on ROAt is positive and significant in most of the models in Table 4, which is consistent with 
the results of Callen and Fang (2013, 2015a, 2015b). The coefficients on LEVERAGEt and SIGMAt exhibit 
inconsistencies in either their signs or statistical significance across the different models in Table 4. This is 
unsurprising, given that prior studies have reported mixed results regarding these two variables. LRETRt 
has a negative and significant coefficient in three of the four models in which it is included, indicating that 
firms with lower long-run effective tax rates have greater crash risk, which is consistent with the main 
findings of Kim et al. (2011a). In addition, in model (2) of Table 4, DIS_ACCRUALSt has a significantly 
positive coefficient while the square of this variable has a significantly negative coefficient. This is 
consistent with the findings of Hutton et al. (2009). In the remaining three models that include this variable 
(models (4), (6), and (8)), neither DIS_ACCRUALSt nor its square is significant. This is unsurprising given 
that the samples used to estimate those three models are necessarily limited to the year 1996 and years 
thereafter, since they include the variable BOARD_INDt (which is available starting in 1996). Hutton et al. 
(2009) find that the significant relation between one-year-ahead crash risk and discretionary accruals 
(which they denote as OPAQUE in their study) disappears completely after the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002. More than half the observations used to estimate models (4), (6), and (8) in Table 
4 are from the post-SOX period, while less than a third of the observations used to estimate model (2) are 
from the post-SOX period, which explains the significance of DIS_ACCRUALSt in model (2) and the lack of 
significance in models (4), (6), and (8).  
In a logistic regression, the coefficients do not represent marginal effects as they do in a linear regression. 
The marginal effect of a particular independent variable on the dependent variable in a logistic regression 
depends on the value of that particular independent variable as well as the values of all other independent 
variables in the model. To elucidate the economic significance of the impact of multinationality on the 
probability of a stock price crash, as well as how this impact varies with the strength of the firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms, in Table 5 we report marginal effects that correspond to the marginal difference 
in crash probability between multinational and domestic firms at different strengths of the three corporate 
governance mechanisms. In Panel A of Table 5, we report marginal effects derived from model (4) of Table 
4 that represent the marginal difference in crash probability between multinational (MNt=1) and domestic 
firms (MNt=0) at different levels of SH_RIGHTSt, while holding all other independent variables in the model 
(including BOARD_INDt and IIO_STABILITYt) at their sample means, which is common convention when 
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estimating marginal effects derived from a logistic regression. The second column in Panel A of Table 5 
shows that, among firms with the weakest shareholder rights (SH_RIGHTSt = 0) the marginal difference in 
the probability of a crash between multinational and domestic firms is 0.0679 (or 6.79 percentage points). 
Given that the unconditional crash probability in our sample is 0.185 (or 18.5%, see Table 2), the estimate 
of 0.0679 is economically meaningful. Among firms with the next lowest value of one for SH_RIGHTSt, the 
second column in Panel A of Table 5 reports a slightly lower marginal difference in one-year-ahead crash 
probability between multinational and domestic firms of 0.0542, which is again economically meaningful. As 
shown in Panel A, the marginal effect of MNt on one-year-ahead crash probability continues to decline as 
shareholder rights increase. In fact, among firms that have the two highest values for SH_RIGHTSt of five 
and six, the marginal differences in crash probability between multinationals and domestics, 0.0030 and -
0.0089 respectively, are small and close to zero.  
Table 5: Marginal Effect of Multinationality on Crash Risk at Different Levels of Corporate Governance 
This table reports marginal effects derived from regression Models (4), (6), and (8) of Table 4 that correspond to the 
marginal difference in crash risk between multinational firms (MNt=1) and domestic firms (MNt=0) at different levels 
of the three corporate governance variables. 
 
Marginal Effect of MNt on 
CRASHt+1  
[from Table 4,  Model (4), 
holding other 
independent variables at 
their sample means] 
Marginal Effect of MNt on 
NCSKEWt+1  
[from Table 4,  Model (6), 
holding the other two 
governance variables at 
their sample means] 
Marginal Effect of MNt on 
DUVOLt+1  
[from Table 4,  Model (8), 
holding the other two 
governance variables at their 
sample means] 
Panel A: Marginal effect of  Multinationality on Crash Risk at Different Levels of Shareholder Rights 
SH_RIGHTSt    
0  (min) 0.0679 0.1028 0.0534 
1 0.0542 0.0820 0.0430 
2 0.0409 0.0612 0.0326 
3 0.0279 0.0403 0.0221 
4 0.0153 0.0195 0.0117 
5 0.0030 -0.0013 0.0012 
6  (max) -0.0089 -0.0221 -0.0092 
Panel B: Marginal effect of  Multinationality on Crash Risk at Different Levels of Board Independence 
BOARD_INDt    
0.00  (min) 0.0803 0.1638 0.0840 
0.40  (10th %ile) 0.0454 0.0833 0.0437 
0.50  (20th %ile) 0.0364 0.0632 0.0336 
0.60  (30th %ile) 0.0274 0.0431 0.0235 
0.67  (40th %ile) 0.0213 0.0297 0.0168 
0.71  (50th %ile) 0.0170 0.0202 0.0120 
0.75  (60th %ile) 0.0137 0.0130 0.0084 
0.80  (70th %ile) 0.0091 0.0029 0.0034 
0.86  (80th %ile) 0.0038 -0.0085 -0.0024 
0.89  (90th %ile) 0.0009 -0.0150 -0.0056 
1.00  (max) -0.0095 -0.0373 -0.0168 
Panel C: Marginal effect of  Multinationality on Crash Risk at Different Levels of Institutional Ownership Stability  
IIO_STABILITYt    
0.0000  (min) 0.2145 0.2469 0.1514 
0.0081  (10th %ile) 0.0678 0.0903 0.0544 
0.0097  (20th %ile) 0.0428 0.0587 0.0348 
0.0106  (30th %ile) 0.0300 0.0417 0.0242 
0.0112  (40th %ile) 0.0212 0.0294 0.0166 
0.0117  (50th %ile) 0.0139 0.0189 0.0102 
0.0122  (60th %ile) 0.0073 0.0092 0.0041 
0.0127  (70th %ile) 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0019 
0.0133  (80th %ile) -0.0054 -0.0104 -0.0080 
0.0138  (90th %ile) -0.0120 -0.0209 -0.0145 
0.0145  (max) -0.0202 -0.0348 -0.0232 
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The second column in Panel B of Table 5 shows how the marginal difference in crash probability between 
multinationals and domestics changes at different levels of board independence. The values we display for 
BOARD_INDt correspond to the sample minimum of this variable (zero), followed by the sample 10
th , 20th, 
30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, and 90th percentile values and, finally, the sample maximum value of 
BOARD_INDt (one). As shown in the second column in Panel B of Table 5, the marginal effect of MNt on 
one-year-ahead crash probability tends to be large and positive at lower levels of BOARD_INDt and 
declines steadily to trivially small values at relatively high levels of BOARD_INDt. In the second column of 
Panel C, Table 5, we repeat the same exercise showing how the marginal effect of MNt on one-year-ahead 
crash probability changes at different levels of institutional ownership stability, and we again observe a 
similar pattern of relatively large and positive marginal effects at low levels of IIO_STABILITYt which 
decline to trivially small values at the highest levels of IIO_STABILITYt. In the third and fourth columns of 
Table 5, we repeat the same kind of tabulation for the marginal effect of MNt on NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 
using coefficient estimates from models (6) and (8), respectively, in Table 4. For each governance variable, 
these marginal effects are computed while holding the other two governance variables at their sample 
means. Thus, they can be directly inferred from the coefficients reported in Table 4 and the sample means 
reported in Table 2, since these models are estimated with linear regressions. As Table 5 shows, the 
marginal effect of MNt on these crash risk measures is relatively large and positive at low levels of each of 
the three corporate governance variables and tends to decline to much smaller values as the strength of 
the given governance variable increases. Overall, the results in Table 5 indicate economically significant 
differences in crash risk between multinational and domestic firms with weaker shareholder rights, less 
independent boards, or less stable institutional ownership. In addition, Table 5 also illustrates that each of 
these three governance mechanisms has an economically significant moderating effect on the impact of 
multinationality on crash risk. 
Additional Tests and Robustness Checks 
We perform a number of additional tests and robustness checks of our main results. For brevity, we 
discuss these results below but do not tabulate them in tables.  
We have considered several other corporate governance variables that have been studied in the finance 
literature. These include board size, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the 
board, whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and blockholder ownership, defined as the 
proportion of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors who own 5% or more of the firm’s 
outstanding shares. However, we do not find significant evidence that these variables are related to crash 
risk or that they affect the relation between crash risk and multinationality in our sample.    
We examine whether the results from our tests persist when we use an expanded version of the five-factor 
model to estimate firm-specific weekly returns. Specifically, we augment Equation (1) with one weekly lag 
and one weekly lead of each factor, yielding the following model: 
ܴ௜,ఛ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵ௜ܴ௠,ఛିଵ + ߚଶ௜ܵܯܤఛିଵ + ߚଷ௜ܪܯܮఛିଵ + ߚସ௜ܷܯܦఛିଵ + ߚହ௜ܫܰܦ௜,ఛିଵ + ߚ଺௜ܴ௠,ఛ + ߚ଻௜ܵܯܤఛ +
 ߚ଼௜ܪܯܮఛ + ߚଽ௜ܷܯܦఛ + ߚଵ଴௜ܫܰܦ௜,ఛ + ߚଵଵ௜ܴ௠,ఛାଵ + ߚଵଶ௜ܵܯܤఛାଵ + ߚଵଷ௜ܪܯܮఛାଵ + ߚଵସ௜ܷܯܦఛାଵ + ߚଵହ௜ܫܰܦ௜,ఛାଵ +
ߝ௜,ఛ                                                       (6) 
The leads and lags are included to correct for potential biases in the loading coefficients caused by non-
synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). Most prior studies of crash risk use an expanded version of the 
market model. However, we view the five-factor model as more robust because it captures systematic size, 
value, momentum, and industry effects. We estimate the model in Equation (6) for each firm-year in the 
sample and then use the log-transformed residuals to compute our crash risk measures. We find that our 
results remain robust.   
Finally, we rerun our regressions in Table 4 using alternative controls for size, leverage, profitability, and 
past stock return performance. For size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets. For leverage, we use 
market leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by the market value of assets, where the market 
value of assets equals book assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of 
common equity. For profitability, we use return-on-equity as in Hutton et al. (2009), defined as income 
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before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of common equity. For past stock return performance, 
we use the firm’s annual market adjusted stock return in year t as in Chen et al. (2001), defined as the 
firm’s raw stock return minus the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. We find that our regression 
results are robust to these alternative specifications.  
Conclusion  
In a large panel of U.S. firms during 1987–2011, we find robust evidence that multinational firms are more 
likely than domestic firms to experience extreme stock price crashes. Our findings are robust to alternative 
measures of crash risk as well as controlling for known predictors of one-year-ahead crash risk identified by 
extant literature, including firm size, leverage, profitability, book-to-market ratio, past stock return 
performance, return volatility, return skewness, trading volume, discretionary accruals, and tax avoidance. 
We also show that the effect of multinationality on crash risk is especially strong among firms with weaker 
corporate governance mechanisms, specifically weaker shareholder rights, less independent boards, and 
less stable institutional ownership. We find that better governance along each of these three dimensions 
substantially reduces the impact of multinationality on crash risk. Our findings are consistent with a greater 
propensity for bad news hoarding in multinational firms relative to domestic firms that is especially strong 
among firms with weaker governance but significantly attenuated in firms with stronger governance.  
Our paper makes several important contributions. First, our research adds to literature in international 
business, finance, and accounting viewing multinational firms from an agency perspective by documenting 
an economically significant, and hitherto unknown, consequence of heighted agency problems in 
multinational firms. Second, our research extends recent academic efforts focused on understanding and 
modeling tail risk in financial markets and, more specifically, the growing literature aimed at identifying firm 
characteristics and corporate activities that portend firm-specific stock price crashes. Our research shines 
the spotlight on an observable firm characteristic with a statistically and economically significant association 
with future crash risk. Given that several recent studies suggest that investors are concerned with tail risk in 
the returns of individual stocks (Conrad et al., 2013; Boyer et al., 2010; Yan, 2011; Barberis and Huang, 
2008; Brunnermeier et al., 2007; Mitton and Vorkink, 2007), our findings should be especially useful to 
market participants, practitioners, and scholars interested in developing predictive models of ex ante tail 
risk in individual stock returns. 
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CRASHt+1 Equals one if the firm experienced a stock price crash during fiscal year t+1 and zero 
otherwise.  A stock price crash is defined as a weekly firm-specific log-return that is 
3.09 or more standard deviations below the firm’s mean weekly firm-specific log-return 
during the given fiscal year.  
NCSKEWt+1 Negative one multiplied by the coefficient of skewness of the firm’s weekly firm-specific 
log-returns during fiscal year t+1. The coefficient of skewness equals the sample third 
central moment divided by the cube of the sample standard deviation. 
DUVOLt+1 The ratio of the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns that are 
below the firm’s mean in fiscal year t+1 divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s 
weekly firm-specific log-returns that are above the firm’s mean in fiscal year t+1. 
MNt Equals one if the firm is a multinational firm in fiscal year t and zero otherwise. A firm is 
defined as multinational if it reports sales by a foreign (non-U.S.) subsidiary.  
SIZEt Natural logarithm of the firm’s inflation-adjusted market value of common equity at the 
close of fiscal year t, measured in millions of 2012 U.S. dollars. 
BMt Book value of common equity divided by the market value of  value of common equity at 
the close of fiscal year t. 
LEVERAGEt Total debt divided by total assets at the close of fiscal year t. 
ROAt Income before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of total assets at the close 
of fiscal year t. 
DTURNt The firm’s average monthly share turnover during fiscal year t minus the firm’s average 
monthly share turnover during fiscal year t-1,where monthly share turnover is defined 
as monthly trading volume (number of shares) divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month. 
NCSKEWt Negative one multiplied by the coefficient of skewness of the firm’s weekly firm-specific 
log-returns during fiscal year t. The coefficient of skewness equals the sample third 
central moment divided by the cube of the sample standard deviation. 
SIGMAt The standard deviation of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns during fiscal year t. 
ALPHAt The natural logarithm of one plus the firm’s estimated intercept coefficient (alpha) from 
the five-factor model (see Equation (1)). The five factor model is estimated using all the 
firm’s weekly stock returns during fiscal year t.   
LRETRt The firm’s long-run effective tax rate, as defined in Dyreng et al. (2008) and Kim, et al. 
(2011a). Equals total taxes paid during the last five fiscal years (years t-4 to t) divided 
by total pre-tax income net of special items during the same period. 
DIS_ACCRUALSt The sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the last three fiscal years 
(years t, t-1, and t-2), as defined in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a). 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model of discretionary 
accruals of Dechow et al. (1995). 
SH_RIGHTSt Six minus the firm’s entrenchment index as defined by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The 
entrenchment index is constructed by adding one point for each of the following 
governance provisions a firm has in place in fiscal year t: staggered board, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, poison pill, and golden parachutes. 
BOARD_INDt Number of independent directors on the board divided by the total number of directors 
on the board in fiscal year t. 
IIO_STABILITYt For firm i in fiscal year t, IIO_STABILITYi,t = max(StdI) - StdIi,t, where StdIi,t is defined 
below and max(StdI) is the sample maximum of StdI across all firms-years in the 
sample. Following Callen and Fang (2013) StdIi,t is defined as the average standard 
deviation of quarterly institutional shareholding proportions across all institutional 
investors in firm i over a 5-year period (year t-4 to year t). Formally, for a given firm i in 
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fiscal year t,  
ܵݐ݀ܫ௜ = ∑ ܵݐ݀(݌௜,௤
௝ )/ܬ௜
௃೔
௝ୀଵ                                               
 where ݌௜,௤
௝  is the proportion of firm i held by institutional investor j at quarter q (q = 1, 2, 
…, 20), ܵݐ݀(݌௜,௤
௝ ) is the time series standard deviation of institutional investor j’s 
quarterly shareholding proportions in firm i during the twenty quarters comprising fiscal 
years t-4 to t, and ܬ௜ is the number of institutional investors in firm i. We follow Callen 
and Fang (2013) and winsorize StdI at the sample 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
 
 
 
